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PUT YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR MIND IS: 
PROTECTING THE MARKETS IN THE AGE OF  
POST-JOBS ACT RULE 506 OFFERINGS 
Alexis A. Geeza* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 5, 2013, all eyes fixated once again on the Super 
Bowl XLVII champions, the Baltimore Ravens, as the ninety-fourth 
NFL season kicked off in Denver.1  Football fans across the country 
would soon set their sights and their hopes on the 2014 Super Bowl.  
With a viewership of 108.7 million in 2013 and 111.3 million in 2012,2 
the Super Bowl is big business.  Companies understand the value of 
marketing their goods and services to such vast audiences and pay a 
premium for the opportunity.3  One advertisement from Super Bowl 
XLVII starred the E*TRADE baby.4  In the commercial, an infant 
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  1  Christina Vinson, Keith Urban, Danielle Bradbery to Kick Off 2013 NFL Season, TASTE 
OF COUNTRY (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://tasteofcountry.com/keith-urban-
danielle-bradbery-2013-nfl-season/. 
 2  David Bauder, Ratings: Another Record for Super Bowl, AP: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 3, 
2014, 7:08 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ratings-another-record-super-bowl.  
 3  See, e.g., Super Bowl Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 2, 2015, 7:08 PM), http://www.cnn. 
com/2013/09/03/us/super-bowl-fast-facts/ (noting that, in 2015, a 30-second 
commercial cost $4.5 million on average, compared to $40,000 in 1967). 
 4  See Chris Choi, NEW E-TRADE Baby Game Day Commercial–Save It–Super Bowl 2013, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7LHJuq4yQWg; see also 
About Us, E*TRADE FIN. CORP., https://about.etrade.com/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 
23, 2015) (defining E*TRADE as “a financial services company that provides online 
brokerage and related products and services primarily to individual retail investors”) 
(emphasis added).  Retail investors are defined as individuals who buy and sell 
securities on their own behalf.  Retail Investor, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/terms/r/retailinvestor.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).  
Offerings to retail investors are typically regulated and, as a result, must comply with 
the registration requirements that the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) 
imposes.  See infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  By contrast, securities not 
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speaking in an adult’s voice touts E*TRADE’s affordable investments 
and lack of hidden fees as a way for working people to save money.5  
The baby, in taking on several different personas throughout the ad, 
paints a picture of a responsible investor contrasted with a spendthrift 
hedonist.6  With the advent of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act 
(the “JOBS” Act), however, the E*TRADE baby may soon face 
competition as a new wave of marketers begins to target retail 
investors.7 
The passage of the JOBS Act on April 5, 2012 stands to forever 
alter Americans’ approach to buying and selling,8 particularly with 
regard to securities.9  An exceptionally intriguing and controversial 
aspect of the JOBS Act is Title II, which addresses Rule 506 offerings.10  
Before Title II became law, any solicitation11 efforts by businesses 
transacting in unregistered securities had to be directed toward a 
target audience of high net worth individuals and institutional buyers.12  
Today, under Title II, these same companies are also permitted to 
solicit retail investors previously accessible only to firms like 
 
being offered to the general public are exempted from the registration requirements.  
See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.  
 5  See Choi, supra note 4 (“Oh, this is tragic, man.  Investors just like you could lose 
tens of thousands of dollars on their 401(k) to hidden fees.  Thankfully E*Trade has 
low cost investments and no hidden fees.  But, you know, if you’re still bent on blowing 
this fat stack of cash, there’s [sic] a couple ways you can do it . . . [there is a short break 
where music is played] or just go to E*Trade and save it.  BOOM!”). 
 6  Id. 
 7  See Halah Touryalai, Ready for Hedge Fund Commercials? SEC to End Ad Ban, FORBES 
(July 10, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013 
/07/10/ready-for-hedge-fund-commercials-sec-to-end-ad-ban/; see also Choi, supra 
note 4; Retail Investor, supra note 4.   
 8  See generally infra Part III.  
 9  The Securities Act defines a security as, inter alia, “any note, stock, . . . security 
future, . . . bond, debenture, . . . investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a security . . . .”  15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 10  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013); infra text accompanying note 59.  The actual 
scope of Title II is broader, but for purposes of this Comment, it will be confined to 
Rule 506 offerings. 
 11  Throughout this Comment, the terms “advertising” and “soliciting,” and 
variations of them, will be used interchangeably.  This is in line with the language of 
Title II itself.  See infra text accompanying note 60 (directing the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to phase out the general solicitation and advertising 
ban). 
 12  In other words, only stock exchange-listed companies could advertise in hopes 
of raising funds from the general public.  See, e.g., Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s 
Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-
guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/.   
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E*TRADE.13  The advertisements can theoretically reach an unlimited 
number of people, not just sophisticated buyers.14 
Title II has the potential to be a positive step for securities 
regulation, but there are a multitude of concerns surrounding this 
change in the law that must be addressed for it to achieve preeminent 
status in the long run.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) identifies fraud prevention and investor safety as the focal points 
of its immediate oversight efforts.15  The SEC’s first steps toward these 
goals16 are encouraging, but they do not go far enough.  Investor 
education must be at the forefront of any initiatives directed at 
protecting the markets.  Specifically, to safeguard the markets, 
investors should be presented with better—not merely additional—
information that has practical utility.  Investors should then bear 
ultimate responsibility for using that information proactively. 
This Comment examines Title II of the JOBS Act as it relates to 
Rule 506 offerings and the SEC’s corresponding regulatory initiatives.  
It analyzes the implications of each with a view toward protecting the 
markets and identifies the steps that the SEC and society must take in 
order to meet this objective.  Part II of this Comment begins with a 
brief discussion of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act), 
which, in a sense, marked the genesis of the advertising ban as it 
existed prior to Title II.  It also provides an overview of the arguments 
advanced over the years in favor of the solicitation prohibition’s repeal.  
Part III presents Title II of the JOBS Act, conceptualized as an indirect 
response to the contentions addressed in Part II.  Part IV details how 
the SEC and members of the public have responded to Title II.  Part V 
argues that the SEC has not done enough to safeguard the markets 
since the enactment of Title II and that investors must take on a more 
proactive role in this endeavor.  It offers further solutions that center 
on investor education.  Part VI concludes. 
 
 13  See infra text accompanying note 60; see also E*TRADE FIN. CORP., supra note 4.   
 14  Buyers, however, must be accredited in order to invest in unregistered 
securities.  Infra note 63 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the differences 
between sophisticated and accredited investors, see generally infra text accompanying 
notes 159–166. 
 15  See infra Part IV.A.  
 16  See infra Part IV.A.  The SEC has enacted a regulation to prevent “bad actors” 
from advertising to the population as a whole if they are likely to perpetuate fraud in 
doing so. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (2013).  The SEC has also proposed rules that would 
require issuers to divulge more information to prospective investors.  Amendments to 
Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806–01 (proposed July 24, 2013) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239).   
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II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR TITLE II 
A.  The Securities Act of 1933 
Before focusing on the advertising ban, it is first necessary to 
understand how members of the public learn about securities.  Such 
learning occurs, in no small part, through operation of the Securities 
Act.  Spurred by the stock market crash of 1929 and dubbed “the first 
major piece of federal legislation regarding the sale of securities,”17 the 
Securities Act aims to foster a culture of full disclosure in the 
marketplace, for the benefit of the population as a whole and investors 
in particular.18  The Securities Act’s originators believed that requiring 
those issuing securities to divulge all material information related to 
their public offerings would insulate the universe of prospective buyers 
from fraudulent investment schemes.19  In this manner, the legislature 
intended the Securities Act to bridge the knowledge gap between 
securities purchasers and sellers.20 
The disclosures of material information that the Securities Act 
requires appear in the form of registration statements that issuers must 
file with the SEC.21  Not all classes of transactions require a registration 
statement, however, and issuers may execute qualifying purchases and 
sales even though the underlying securities are unregistered.22  
 
 17  Securities Act of 1933, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ 
securitiesact1933.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).  
 18  See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953); SEC v. Glenn W. 
Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480–81 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 19  See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 124; Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 
F.2d at 480–81. 
 20  Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971).  
 21  15 U.S.C.A. § 77f(a) (West 2012).  Registration statements must discuss thirty-
two categories of information, contained in Schedule A, for transactions involving 
domestic securities.  Id. § 77g(a)(1); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 77aa (West 1998).  These 
include, inter alia, “the location of the issuer’s principal business office . . . a statement 
of the capitalization of the issuer . . . [and] the price at which it is proposed that the 
security shall be offered to the public or the method by which such price is 
computed . . . .”  § 77aa.  The public can access the information within a registration 
statement after it is filed.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77f(d).  Importantly, the transactions described 
in the registration statement cannot be executed until the SEC approves said 
statement.  Id. § 77e(a).   
 22  § 77d.  Despite the fact that exempt offerings do not need to be registered, 
issuers must still file an electronic Form D notice of sales with the SEC.  17 C.F.R. § 
239.500(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012).  Form D is brief and requests identifying information 
about the company’s executives as well as “the size of the offering and the date of first 
sale.”  Form D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ formd.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2015); see also infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing 
the SEC’s proposed changes to Form D).  
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Categorically, “transactions by an issuer not involving any public 
offering” are excused from the registration statement mandate,23 a 
notion referred to as the private placement exemption.  The private 
placement exemption covers three types of offerings which are laid out 
in Regulation D, promulgated by the SEC.24  Although the ability to 
forgo filing a registration statement is attractive to issuers, this benefit 
did not always come without a cost.  When enacted, Regulation D 
prohibited issuers applying for an exemption25 and those acting on 
their behalf from using “general solicitation or general advertising” to 
appeal to investors.26  This caveat, though well-intentioned, ignited an 
ongoing debate driving at its very necessity and viability. 
  
 
 23  § 77d(a)(2) (emphasis added).  By way of example, hedge funds have 
historically relied on the private placement exemption, unlike mutual funds.  William 
K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 
1147 (2013) [hereinafter Sjostrom, Rebalancing].  The vast majority of hedge fund 
managers enjoy existing relationships with their investors; they do not seek them out.  
See, e.g., Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should 
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 134 (2010).  
 24  17 C.F.R. § 230.500(a) (2013); see also Investor Bulletin: Private Placements under 
Regulation D, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/oiea/ 
investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html.   
 25  The Regulation D exemptions include Rules 504, 505, and 506.  Id. §§ 230.504–
230.506.  In general, these exemptions involve either a small monetary transaction or 
a small number of investors.  Id.  Under Rule 504, issuers raising no more than 
$1,000,000 through securities may sell to an unlimited number of buyers without 
completing a registration statement.  Id. § 230.504; see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK 
RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 413 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 8th ed. 2012); Rule 504 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule504.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).  Rule 505 
permits issuers not raising more than $5,000,000 through securities to sell to up to 
thirty-five buyers without completing a registration statement.  § 230.505; see also KLEIN, 
RAMSEYER & BAINBRIDGE, supra, at 413; Rule 505 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).  Under 
Rule 506, issuers raising more than $5,000,000 through securities may sell to up to 
thirty-five buyers without completing a registration statement, so long as the buyers 
pass investor sophistication tests.  § 230.506; see also KLEIN, RAMSEYER & BAINBRIDGE, 
supra, at 413; Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).  Rule 506 is most 
critical for purposes of this Comment.  
 26  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2008).  General solicitations and general advertisements 
included not only newspaper and television communications, but also seminars in 
which participants were invited by those means.  Id.  Given the dearth of publicly 
available information, those considering hedge funds as investments typically looked 
to limited index reports and due diligence inspections.  Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk 
Prevention the New Paradigm?  A Proposal to Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge 
Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87, 118 (2012).   
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B. The Rationale for the Solicitation Prohibition and Arguments 
Advanced in Favor of Its Repeal 
Scholars construe the rationale for this advertising prohibition, 
applied to private placement issuers, as both facilitating SEC 
enforcement efforts and maintaining investor confidence.27  In terms 
of enforcement efforts, if issuers are not allowed to solicit potential 
buyers and proceed to engage in large-scale advertising, then they may 
be more likely to attract the attention of the SEC.28  With respect to 
investor confidence, investors’ faith in the system may be undermined 
if they are continually met with a confusing barrage of solicitations in 
the marketplace.29  Categorically banning advertisements, then, may 
protect buyers from accidently investing in “risky” private funds, since 
it will be more difficult for purchasers to identify these ventures on 
their own.30 
Notwithstanding the concerns that the advertising ban attempted 
to guard against, opponents have advanced a number of arguments 
over the years in support of its repeal, for both procedural and 
substantive reasons.  On the procedural side, states have much 
flexibility to determine how to frame their private placement 
exemptions to align with Regulation D.31  The resulting procedural 
variation across states militates against the goal of uniform investor 
protections.32  For example, if New Jersey structures its private 
placement exemptions in one way and Florida does so in another, then 
the formula for Regulation D compliance could conceivably differ 
between the two states, such that New Jersey investors will have a 
distinct experience from Florida investors. 
On the substantive side, a primary justification for lifting the 
solicitation prohibition is to facilitate the exchange of information to 
more accurately reflect the realities of the marketplace.  This objective 
stands to benefit three groups: (1) investors; (2) entities; and (3) 
 
 27  See generally infra Part IV.B.1. 
 28  William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and 
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (2004) [hereinafter Sjostrom, 
Relaxing].   
 29  Rory B. O’Halloran, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge 
Fund Regulation, 79 TUL. L. REV. 461, 478 (2004).   
 30  Joseph Lanzkron, The Hedge Fund Holdup: The SEC’s Repeated Unnecessary Attacks 
on the Hedge Fund Industry, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1509, 1545–46 (2008); see also Martin, 
supra note 26, at 118.  
 31  Deregulating Capital Markets: Hearing on H.R. 2131 Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Dee 
R. Harris, President, N. Am. Sec. Admin. Ass’n), available at 1995 WL 722354.   
 32  Id.  
GEEZA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:33 AM 
2015] COMMENT 587 
 
regulators.  First, one commenter construes the advertising ban as the 
driving force behind the general lack of understanding surrounding 
private placements as investment tools.33  For example, if hedge funds 
never release television commercials, then people will be less inclined 
to consider them as a financial strategy, let alone be able to distinguish 
a hedge fund from a mutual fund.  Individuals who “may never actually 
purchase securities”34 thus stand to profit from an enhanced 
understanding of how private placements operate.35 
Second, and beyond the ambit of individual investors, 
introducing more solicitations into the marketplace may increase 
competition between entities; as they vie for investors and attempt to 
attract them, entities may begin charging lower performance fees in an 
effort to increase their appeal to prospective investors.36  For their part, 
investors—armed with more material—will have the capacity to make 
better-informed decisions about where to allocate their money, rather 
than simply choosing the first issuer they come in contact with. 
Third, if additional information begins to flood the marketplace 
in the aftermath of the solicitation ban’s repeal, then regulatory bodies 
are also poised to profit.  From the regulators’ perspective, it will be 
easier to ascertain whether a particular private placement is abusing 
investors, since regulators will be able to uncover its strategy by the 
content of its advertisements.37  If solicitations are available for 
inspection, then the opportunity to move away from limited index 
reports and due diligence inspections (both of which require 
significant time and money) will help regulatory bodies to realize cost 
savings and to complete their investigative efforts more quickly.38  
Though expensive, limited index reports and due diligence 
inspections generally produce unreliable information for anyone 
 
 33  O’Halloran, supra note 29, at 478.  By contrast, some suggest that because 
accredited investors have the capacity to look out for their own financial interests, the 
prohibition against issuer solicitations does not have any noticeable effect on them.  
See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1615 (2013).   
 34  David M. Lynn & Anna T. Pinedo, A Quick Guide to the JOBS Act, PRACTICAL LAW 
CO. 1, 5 (2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120416-PLI-Quick-
Guide-JOBS-Act.pdf [hereinafter Lynn & Pinedo, Quick].  
 35  Alexander R. Roche, The Regulator Strikes Back: A Look at the SEC’s Most Recent 
Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds and What It Missed, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 145, 178 
(2007).  In particular, having additional knowledge at one’s disposal can lead to better 
decision making.  Id. at 176.   
 36  O’Halloran, supra note 29, at 489.  
 37  Roche, supra note 35, at 179.  
 38  Martin, supra note 26, at 118.   
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attempting to determine the benefits of investing in a particular hedge 
fund.39 
A final argument in favor of the solicitation ban’s repeal reflects 
the commonly espoused economic reality “that the key to selling a 
product is marketing.”40  The prohibition is especially burdensome to 
businesses that lack large-scale advertising budgets.  In fact, some 
scholars note that “[t]here is no greater impediment to the ability of 
small companies to raise capital under the securities laws than the SEC 
rules against general solicitation and advertising.”41  Specifically, small 
issuers often experience difficulty locating brokers who are willing to 
assist them in selling their securities, and so the prohibition grinds to 
a halt their already modest attempts at solicitation.42 
Given the irrefutable fact that today’s global marketplace relies 
heavily on advertising,43 lifting the ban is readily viewed as an attempt 
to keep pace with the times44 and to enable all entities to fulfill what 
business necessity often demands.  The act of soliciting cannot be 
divorced from the notion of capturing the public’s attention.  Indeed, 
whether the advertising ban serves any purpose other than to ensure 
that certain sales remain private is a subject of intense discussion.45 
 
 
 39  Id. 
 40  Sjostrom, Relaxing, supra note 28, at 33.  U.S.-based companies spent 10.4% of 
their annual revenue for 2012 on general marketing activities.  Key Findings From U.S. 
Digital Marketing Spending Survey, 2013, GARTNER (Mar. 6, 2013), http:// 
www.gartner.com/technology/research/digital-marketing/digital-marketing-spend-
report.jsp.  On average, the surveyed organizations expected to devote 5.7% more of 
their 2013 budgets to marketing.  Id.  
 41  Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing Failure 
to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 36 (2007).  
 42  Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under 
Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention, 74 KY. L.J. 127, 142–43 (1985).  
 43  See Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Lifts Advertising Ban on Private Investments, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/s-e-
c-lifts-advertising-ban-on-private-investments/?_r=1.  Additionally, mutual funds have 
long been allowed to solicit investors.  Touryalai, supra note 7; see, e.g., Choi, supra note 
4.  Mutual funds, unlike hedge funds, cater to retail rather than to sophisticated 
investors.  E*TRADE FIN. CORP., supra note 4. 
 44  Hedge funds and other private placements are no longer the exclusive domain 
of institutional investors.  Lattman, supra note 43.  Hedge fund managers are also 
spending increasingly more time in the public eye and are consequently being viewed 
as more accessible.  See id. (noting that Och-Ziff Capital Management, a hedge fund, 
is a public company).   
 45  Sjostrom, Relaxing, supra note 28, at 40.   
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III. TITLE II OF THE JOBS ACT 
Part II of this Comment presented a number of persuasive 
arguments in support of eliminating the solicitation ban for private 
placements.  It is interesting to note, then, that lawmakers did not have 
this as their end-goal when drafting the legislation that ultimately lifted 
the advertising prohibition.  Rather, this change in the law was 
ancillary to a more general objective, namely, job creation by small 
businesses.46  Representative Stephen Lee Fincher (R-TN) introduced 
the Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth 
Companies Act of 2012 (“Emerging Growth Companies Act”) in the 
House on December 8, 2011.47  He expressed his rationale for the bill: 
“Burdensome costs are discouraging companies from going public, 
which deprives firms of the capital needed to expand their businesses 
and hire more American workers. . . . ‘[O]ne-size-fits-all’ laws and 
regulations have changed the nature of the United States’ capital 
markets . . . .”48 
Over the course of the nearly four months that the House and 
Senate deliberated the Emerging Growth Companies Act, lawmakers 
began referring colloquially to the Act and the other bills alongside it 
as the JOBS Act.49  Repealing the solicitation ban also became a hot-
button issue with Representative Kevin McCarthy’s (R-CA) proposal 
that only Rule 506 offerings under Regulation D be allowed to 
advertise.50  He sought further to clarify that a company’s choosing to 
solicit to the public does not render its offering public.51  In addition, 
Representative Patrick McHenry (R-NC) recommended that private 
shares be made available to accredited investors via trading platforms.52  
These proposals took shape in the eventual law, which instructed the 
SEC to permit solicitations for private offerings falling under the Rule 
506 umbrella, so long as only accredited investors are permitted to buy 
the securities involved.53 
 
 46  See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. E2210–04 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Hon. 
Stephen Lee Fincher).  
 47  Id. 
 48  Id.; see also David M. Lynn & Anna T. Pinedo, The JOBS Act, MORRISON FOERSTER 
1, 1 (2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120326-The-JOBS-Act.pdf.   
 49  Brett Logiurato, Obama Is About to Sign the JOBS Act: Here Are the Major Points of 
the New Law, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.businessinsider. 
com/here-are-the-major-points-of-the-jobs-act-2012-3.  
 50  H.R. REP. NO. 112-409, pt. 10, at 3 (2012).  
 51  Id.  
 52  Id. at pt. 11.  
 53  See infra text accompanying notes 60–63.  
GEEZA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:32 AM 
590 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:581 
 
 
The law achieved the “increasingly rare legislative victory”54 of 
bipartisan support, passing 380 to 41 in the House55 and 73 to 26 in the 
Senate.56  President Obama signed the JOBS Act into law on April 5, 
2012,57 the stated purpose of which was “[t]o increase American job 
creation and economic growth by improving access to the public 
capital markets for emerging growth companies.”58  Title II, termed 
“Access to Capital for Job Creators,” highlights the new role that 
advertising is to play in Rule 506 offerings in Section 201: 
“Modification of Exemption.”59  Section 201 directs the SEC to revise 
its rules within ninety days to lift the general solicitation and 
advertising ban for Rule 506 offerings,60 marking the end of an eighty-
year prohibition61 by permitting certain private placements to raise 
funds in the open market.62  Title II, however, does not permit just 
anyone to take part in the transactions.  Rather, it requires the SEC to 
mandate in its new rule that everyone purchasing the securities be an 
accredited investor.63  The SEC is empowered under Title II to require 
 
 54  Seung Min Kim, JOBS Act Passes Congress, Heads to Obama, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 
2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74539.html (quoting 
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA)). 
 55  House Vote 132 - Final Passage for JOBS Bill, N.Y. TIMES POLS. (Mar. 27, 2012, 2:17 
PM), http://politics.nytimes.com/congress/votes/112/house/2/132.  
 56  Edward Wyatt, Senate Passes Start-Ups Bill, With Amendments, N.Y. TIMES BUS. DAY 
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/business/senate-passes-start-
ups-bill-with-amendments.html?_r=0.  
 57  President Obama Signs the JOBS Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2012, 7:24 
PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/04/05/ president-
obama-signs-jobs-act.   
 58  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).  
 59  Id. at 313–14. 
 60  Id. 
 61  See, e.g., How General Solicitation Works, CROWDFUNDER BLOG, http:// 
www.crowdfunder.com/p/how-general-solicitation-works/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2015); 
Dave Michaels, SEC Votes to Ease 80-Year-Old Ban on Private-Investment Ads, BLOOMBERG 
(July 10, 2013, 1:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-09/sec-set-to-lift-
80-year-old-ban-on-advertising-by-hedge-funds.html; Lattman, supra note 43.  Even 
President Obama has echoed the historical significance of Title II, indicating as he 
signed the bill that “[A] lot’s changed in 80 years, and it’s time our laws did as well.” 
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act (Apr. 5, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.mofo.com/files/ 
Uploads/Images/DCPD-201200249.pdf).  
 62  See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013); How General Solicitation Works, supra note 
61.  This change has no effect on Rule 506 offerings’ being classified as private; they 
will continue to be deemed private regardless of whether their issuers choose to 
advertise to the public or not.  See supra text accompanying note 51.   
 63  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 
306, 313 (2012); Lynn & Pinedo, Quick, supra note 34, at 5.  
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issuers to take reasonable steps—that it identifies—to determine 
whether purchasers are accredited.64  Thus, as the literal language of 
the law indicates, the SEC is afforded much discretion to effectuate 
Title II. 
IV. THE SEC’S AND SOCIETY’S RESPONSES TO TITLE II OF THE JOBS ACT 
A. The SEC’s Response to Title II 
July 10, 2013 was a busy day for the SEC.65  It began by doing 
exactly what Title II called for.  First, the SEC amended Rule 506 to 
enable issuers relying on that Regulation D exemption to advertise or 
solicit their securities offerings.66  Second, the SEC imposed the 
condition that all purchasers be accredited and that issuers take 
reasonable steps to guarantee that buyers are accredited.67  The SEC, 
however, decided to take this several steps further.  Namely, it 
 
 64  See § 201, 126 Stat. at 313–14.  
 65  Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves JOBS Act Requirement to Lift General 
Solicitation Ban: Commission Also Adopts Rule to Disqualify Bad Actors from Certain 
Offerings and Proposes Rules to Enable SEC to Monitor New Market and Bolster 
Investor Protections (July 10, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/ 
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539707782#.UvPmgrQi-Vo.  
 66  See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N  1, 17 (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf. 
 67  Id.  Amended Regulation D proffers four “non-exclusive and non-mandatory 
methods” to ascertain whether an individual purchasing securities is an accredited 
investor: (1) Income-based: reviewing any Internal Revenue Service form that reports 
income for the past two years and obtaining written verification from the prospective 
investor that she reasonably expects to achieve at least the same level of income in the 
current year; (2) Net worth-based: examining, inter alia, bank statements or credit reports 
from the past three months and acquiring written verification from the prospective 
investor that he has revealed all liabilities that could factor into a determination of his 
net worth; (3) Written confirmation from a verifying person or entity: obtaining written 
verification from, inter alia, a registered broker-dealer or certified public accountant 
confirming that he has taken reasonable steps to verify the prospective investor’s 
accreditation status within the past three months, and that the prospective investor is 
accredited; or (4) Certification from the purchaser himself: procuring verification from a 
prospective investor that he is accredited at the time the security is sold, provided that 
the investor allotted funds to the issuer prior to September 23, 2013 and continues to 
hold the same offering.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(D) (2013).  If using method 
(1), supra, then the individual’s annual income must exceed $200,000 (individually) 
or $300,000 (with a spouse).  § 230.501(a)(6).  If using method (2), supra, then the 
individual’s own net worth—or joint net worth with a spouse—must exceed 
$1,000,000.  Id. § 230.501(a)(5); see also § 201, 126 Stat. at 313.  Any of these methods, 
however, is an acceptable means of verifying accredited investor status, provided that 
the issuer does not know that the buyer is unaccredited.  See, e.g., § 230.506(c)(2)(ii); 
§ 201, 126 Stat. at 313–14.  Crucially, the issuer is not mandated to use any of the four 
methods from § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(D).  § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(D).  
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identified two critical issues surrounding Title II’s implementation that 
are worthy of attention: 1) vetting the private placements choosing to 
solicit68 and 2) protecting investors.69 
1. Vetting the Private Placements Choosing to Solicit 
In addition to lifting the advertising ban, the SEC amended Rule 
506 to comply with Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.70  Although this action did not tie 
directly to the solicitation prohibition, it served to bar “felons and 
other ‘bad actors’” from relying on the Rule 506 exemption.71  Under 
the new rule, issuers and covered individuals fall under the felons and 
other bad actors umbrella if they have a “disqualifying event,”72 which 
generally contains some element of fraud: 
[W]e recognize the concerns raised by a number of 
commenters that a general solicitation for a Rule 506(c) 
offering would attract both accredited and non-accredited 
investors and could result in an increase in fraudulent activity in 
the Rule 506 market, as well as an increase in unlawful sales of 
securities to non-accredited investors.73 
Rule 506 enumerates eight disqualifying events that will preclude 
a person from tendering offerings of securities under the rule.74  It will, 
 
 68  See infra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
 69  See infra notes 77–95 and accompanying text.  
 70  Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, 78 
Fed. Reg. 44,730-01, 44,730 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
200, 230, 239).  
 71  Id.   
 72  § 230.506(d) (noting that covered individuals include, inter alia, people 
compensated for advertising to buyers, general partners or managing members of the 
advertiser, and directors and officers taking part in the advertiser’s offering or in the 
advertiser’s general partners’ or management members’ offering); see also  
Fact Sheet: Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item2.htm 
(last modified July 10, 2013).   
 73  Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806-01, 
44,807 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (emphasis 
added).  
 74  The eight disqualifying events are: (1) Criminal convictions entered within the 
last five years (in the case of issuers) or within the last ten years (in the case of other 
covered persons) that relate to the purchase or sale of securities, false SEC filings, or 
business conduct; (2) Court orders, judgments, or decrees entered within the past 5 years 
that are in effect at the time of sale and that relate to the purchase or sale of securities, 
false SEC filings, or business conduct; (3) Final orders issued by, inter alia, federal 
banking regulators that either prevent the issuer from associating with a regulated 
entity or participating in the business of purchasing or selling securities; (4) SEC 
disciplinary orders that suspend or revoke registration, or that limit the issuer’s activities; 
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however, be a defense that the individual could not have known, even 
through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she was subject to 
a disqualifying event.75  Although disqualifying events prior to the 
rule’s effective date of September 23, 2013 will not count, issuers must 
notify purchasers in writing of any such events that took place prior to 
the effective date.76 
2. Protecting Investors 
Also on July 10, 2013, the SEC proposed a rule addressing 
concerns over the manner in which information related to Rule 506 
offerings is presented to investors.77  The proposed rule requires issuers 
who have not filed Form D to file an initial Form D at least fifteen 
calendar days before commencing advertising efforts for the offering.78  
Regarding the actual content of Form D, the SEC proposed an update 
to Item 6 for those filling out the form to indicate whether they are 
relying on Rule 506(c).79  It also proposed adding six new items to the 
form.80  Under the proposed rule, issuers who have not complied with 
the Form D filing requirements within the past five years are barred, 
 
(5) SEC cease and desist orders relating to, inter alia, scienter-based antifraud provisions 
of the securities laws, entered within the past 5 years and in effect at the time of sale; 
(6) Suspension or expulsion from becoming a member in, or associating with, a registered 
national securities exchange or securities association; (7) Refusal and stop orders, and 
orders suspending Regulation A, for registration statements entered within the past 5 
years; or (8) False representation orders by the United States Postal Service.  
§ 230.506(d)(1)(i)–(viii).   
 75  Id. § 230.506(d)(2)(iv).   
 76  Id. § 230.506(e).  
 77  Fact Sheet: Proposing Amendments to Private Offering Rules: SEC Open Meeting, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item3.htm 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2013).   
 78  Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,810–
11. 
 79  Id. at 44,814; see also Form D, supra note 22; Form D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 1, 
2 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf.   
 80  New items 17–22 include, inter alia,  
The number and types of accredited investors that purchased securities 
in the offering . . . if the issuer used a registered broker-dealer in 
connection with the offering, whether any general solicitation materials 
were filed with FINRA . . . for Rule 506(c) offerings, the types of general 
solicitation used or to be used (e.g., mass mailing . . . public Web sites, 
social media . . . ) . . . .   
See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,815; see 
also Brandon J. Rees, File No. S7-06-13, AFL-CIO 1, 3 (2013), http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-423.pdf (noting that the information 
provided in the legends on the marketing materials—infra note 82 and accompanying 
text—does  not adequately capture the risks associated with private fund investments).   
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for one year, from relying on Rule 506.81  Filling out paperwork 
correctly thus takes on monumental importance, as a mistake will 
mean the difference between being allowed to engage in general 
solicitation and being barred from doing so. 
The SEC proposed further that a number of conditions be 
imposed on the written advertising materials employed by issuers.  One 
requirement is that issuers include prominent legends on all written 
solicitations.82  These legends, though not conditions of Rule 506,83 
inform investors “as to whether they are qualified” and of certain 
investment risks.84  Some commenters, however, have suggested that 
additional constraints be imposed on hedge funds, venture capital 
funds, and private equity funds85 that will be advertising, in the form of 
specific content requirements and restrictions:86 
Because investors consider performance to be one of the 
most significant factors when evaluating investments, we are 
concerned that private funds [sic] presenting non-current 
performance data may confuse, and even mislead, investors 
regarding the fund’s current performance, particularly if the 
fund’s performance has changed significantly after the 
period reflected in the advertisement.87 
 
 
 81  Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,817. 
 82  The legends would indicate that securities may only be sold to accredited 
investors as defined and stipulate: (1) that “securities are being offered in reliance on 
an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act”; (2) that the 
SEC has not passed on the merits of the offering; (3) that investors are not to assume 
that resale is an option; and (4) that investing in securities involves an inherent degree 
of risk that investors must be prepared to bear.  Id. at 44,821–22. 
 83  Id. at 44,823.  But see David Certner, Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 
156 Under the Securities Act, AARP 1, 4 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
13/s70613-429.pdf.  
 84  See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,822.  
 85  While mutual funds are heavily regulated, hedge and private equity funds are 
not.  Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability 
and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
1, 4 (2007).  The SEC, and FINRA, to a lesser extent, regulate mutual funds.  Donald 
C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 
95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2009).  Because of this oversight, mutual funds do not often 
rely on the speculative practices, such as short-selling, that hedge funds do.  Office of 
Investor Educ. and Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Hedge Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
1, 1 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ ib_hedgefunds.pdf; see also Anita K. 
Krug, Financial Regulatory Reform and Private Funds, BERKELEY CTR. FOR L., BUS. & ECON. 
1, 6 (2009) [hereinafter Krug, Financial] (noting that private funds can pursue virtually 
any investment strategy). 
 86  See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,822. 
 87  Id. at 44,823 (emphasis added).  
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With this view in mind, the SEC recommended a mandate that private 
funds include a legend on any written advertising materials not subject 
to the provisions of the Investment Company Act.88  In addition to 
legends on these funds’ advertising materials, the SEC proposed a 
number of disclaimers under Rule 509(c), to be made by funds citing 
performance data: (1) that the data represents past performance and 
is not a perfect predictor of future outcomes; (2) that current 
performance may not match the data in the solicitation materials; (3) 
that private funds are not required to follow any standard 
methodology; and (4) that a one-to-one comparison of private funds’ 
performance may not be possible.89  In addition, the private funds the 
proposed rule targets must provide a phone number or website 
through which prospective investors can access up-to-date 
performance data.90  The SEC also encourages a need for private funds 
to be mindful of the types of sales literature that are considered to be 
“misleading for purposes of the federal securities laws.”91 
Finally, under proposed Rule 510T under Regulation D, issuers 
relying on Rule 506(c) will be required to submit their written 
advertising materials to the SEC no later than the date the materials 
are first used in conjunction with the offering.92  The comment period 
for these proposed rules closed on November 4, 2013.93  The discussion 
is far from over, however, as society continues to respond to these 
changes in earnest.94  A final rule is expected in October 2015.95 
 
 88  Id.  The Investment Company Act includes, inter alia, limitations on leverage 
“and requirements regarding independent board members” that are inapplicable to 
private funds.  Id.   
 89  Id. at 44,822–23. 
 90  Id. at 44,823.  
 91  Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,825. 
 92  Id. at 44,828.  This proposed rule would only exist for two years after its effective 
date in order to give the SEC an opportunity to assess market practices.  Id.   
 93  Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156; Re-Opening of Comment 
Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 61,222-01, 61,223 (proposed Oct. 3, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 230, 239). 
 94  See infra notes 96–129 and accompanying text.   
 95  View Rule, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, http://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201410&RIN=3235-AL46# (last visited Mar. 23, 
2015). 
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B. Society’s Response to Title II 
1. The Opposition’s View 
The SEC’s actions have not received unanimous support96—even 
within the SEC itself.  Commissioner Aguilar vehemently opposed 
lifting the advertising ban.97  He predicates his divergent view on the 
danger of fraud, specifically, that scammers will use any number of 
solicitation tools to generate compelling, imaginative (and dishonest) 
sales pitches that will ultimately harm investors.98  The lack of available 
data on the percentage of accredited investors who are susceptible to 
the pull of glossy advertisements99 leaves unanswered the question of 
whether investors are better- or worse-off following the 
implementation of Title II of the JOBS Act. 
While some believe that any hysteria surrounding the new law is 
much ado about nothing,100 a sizeable segment of society agrees with 
Commissioner Aguilar.  To begin, up until this point, the entities 
prohibited from advertising to the general population have enjoyed a 
certain mystique by virtue of their being inaccessible to everyday 
people.101  Title II of the JOBS Act stands to increase the visibility of 
 
 96  See generally infra notes 101–129 and accompanying text.  
 97  Lattman, supra note 43. 
 98  Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Facilitating General 
Solicitation at the Expense of Investors (July 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539684712#.UnPT3uKluZQ.  
 99  Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1617. 
 100  The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), for example, does not 
believe that its member firms will be quick to start advertising to the general public.  
Jennifer Connell Dowling, The SEC’s Proposed New Rules on General Solicitation, 
NVCACCESS (Sept. 25, 2013), http://nvcaccess.nvca.org/index.php/topics/public-
policy/385-the-secs-proposed-new-rules-on-general-solicitation.html.  In particular, 
issuers may stand to gain little from allotting resources to an innovative marketing 
program if they already “have an established marketing presence and a deep liquid 
investor base.”  Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Lifts Longtime Advertising Ban for Hedge Funds, 
Others, REUTERS (July 10, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
07/10/us-sec-advertising-idUSBRE9690I520130710 (quoting Matthew Kaplan, 
partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).  The NVCA also believes that even if its venture 
capital firms decide to include advertisements in their corporate strategies moving 
forward, the additional requirements imposed by the SEC go too far in terms of the 
amount and type of material they require.  Dowling, supra; see also Michaels, supra note 
61 (noting that the private securities market may be weighed down by the costly new 
rules). 
 101  Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3396 
(2013).  The “exotic investments” at issue include hedge funds and private equity 
funds.  Id. at 3389.  Hedge funds are extremely restrictive in terms of who has access 
to them.  See generally Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX 
LAW. 133, 134 (2003).  Furthermore, hedge funds largely rely on speculative practices, 
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these private placements as investment tools.102  Individuals who have 
not had occasion to invest in hedge funds may have concluded that 
they are the exclusive province of the wealthy and may choose to go 
after them, believing that enormous returns are simply unrealistic in 
the retail market.103 
Even more specifically, the public sentiment surrounding 
“Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 Offerings under 
the Securities Act” is captured in the comment letters presented to the 
SEC.  These letters fall into two broad categories, Type A and Type B.104  
Forty-nine individuals and entities submitted some variation of Letter 
Type A,105 the main concern of which is startups’ ability to raise money 
publicly.106  Multiple factors drive this worry: 
 Startups that break the rules will remove any chance of 
raising capital for themselves.107 
 Startups will try to raise money privately due to the 
onerous nature of the rules.108 
 Startups will face difficulty “notify[ing] the SEC in 
advance, fil[ing] documents every time there is a new 
communication with investors and includ[ing] boilerplate 
with every communication” if bankers are unavailable to 
aid them in their fundraising efforts.109 
Letter Type A advocates favor permitting third parties to complete SEC 
filings for startups, requiring boilerplate language only when 
discussing the terms of financing, and breaking the connection 
 
such as short-selling.  Office of Investor Educ. & Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Hedge 
Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 1, 2 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/investor/ 
alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf; see also Krug, Financial, supra note 85, at 6. 
 102  Rodrigues, supra note 101, at 3396.  Significantly, the North American Securities 
Administrators Assocation compiles a list of the top ten investor traps every year, and 
private placements routinely make the list.  A. Heath Abshure, NASAA Comments in 
Response to Release No. 33-9354 (File No. S7-07-12), “Eliminating the Prohibition Against 
General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A,” NASAA 1, 2 
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-92.pdf. 
 103  Rodrigues, supra note 101, at 3413.   
 104  Comments on Proposed Rule: Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under 
the Securities Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
13/s70613.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 105  Id.  
 106  If unable to raise adequate funds, then a startup with otherwise fantastic 
potential may be driven out of business.  Letter Type A, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-13/s70613-48.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014).   
 107  Id.  
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. 
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between noncompliance and elimination of any chance to 
subsequently raise money.110  These suggestions have potential to shift 
some of the documentation burden away from startups, to permit 
flexibility for the use of innovative language when appropriate, and to 
lessen the severity of the consequences flowing from honest or 
insignificant mistakes. 
During the same comment period, one hundred sixty individuals 
and entities submitted some variation of Letter Type B.111  Angel 
investor groups112 in New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut 
spearheaded this petition, cautioning that, as a result of the SEC’s new 
rule, both angel investing and the number of jobs available in the U.S. 
will decline.113  As such, the one hundred sixty endorsed the following 
alternatives: 
 Withdraw the proposed amendments to both Regulation 
D and Form D.114 
 Eradicate the notion that acquiring startup funding from 
family members and friends, even on a limited basis, 
should negatively impact startups’ ability to rely on the 
Rule 506(c) exemption.115 
 Define members of angel groups, and those who put 
forward an investment of at least $10,000, as express 
categories of accredited investors.116 
 Clarify that neither events with a capped number of 
attendees, e.g., demo days, nor events that are devoid of  
 
 
 110  Id. 
 111  Comments on Proposed Rule: Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156 under 
the Securities Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
13/s70613.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
 112  Angel investor groups furnish “financial backing for small startups or 
entrepreneurs” on either a one-time or an ongoing basis and on generally favorable 
terms.  Angel Investor, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/ 
angelinvestor.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).  In contrast to venture capitalists, angel 
investors’ primary focus is helping fledgling businesses grow, rather than realizing 
high returns on their investments.  Id.  
 113  Urgent Angel Investors’ Comments on Rule 506 Final & Proposed Regs, IPETITIONS 1, 
2 (2013), http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/urgent-angel-investors-comments-on-
rule-506-final/. 
 114  Id. at 3.  Because a startup’s inadvertent rule violation will result in a shortage 
of funding and possibly bankruptcy, angel investors will begin to view startups as 
uncomfortably risky enterprises.  Id. 
 115  Id.  Angel investors view “the commitment of Friend [sic] and Family [as] an 
initial sign of the commitment and integrity of an entrepreneur.”  Id.  
 116  Id. at 4.   
GEEZA (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  10:33 AM 
2015] COMMENT 599 
 
any mention of a securities offering, qualifies as a general 
solicitation.117 
2. The Opposition’s Response to the Support 
Title II’s supporters cite to the fact that issuers relying on the 
general solicitation allowance can only sell to accredited investors.118  
An accredited investor, however, is defined as any individual whose 
annual income exceeds $200,000.119  This threshold is not a high bar 
to meet.  In fact, in 2011, roughly 6.07 million Americans earned more 
than $200,000;120 estimates also posit that “133,000 male heads of 
household and 143,000 female heads of household” earn more than 
$200,000 annually.121  These figures do not represent a miniscule subset 
of the population.  Opponents argue against removing the solicitation 
ban on grounds that it prematurely assumes that all individuals who 
are accredited for purposes of Title II of the JOBS Act are sophisticated as 
a matter of course.122  Wealthy senior citizens are offered as a prime 
example.123  Even otherwise financially savvy investors may have trouble 
protecting themselves if the investment scheme in question is 
complicated enough.124  Thus, some suggest overhauling the definition 
of accredited investor.125 
 
 117  See Urgent Angel, supra note 113, at 4–5. 
 118  See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 
Stat. 306, 313–14 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(D) (2013).   
 119  See § 230.501(a)(6).  Due to inflation, one need not be extremely well-off in 
order to be considered an accredited investor; a number of retail investors fit within 
this category.  Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1616.   
 120  Ron Scherer, Obama Tax Proposal: Who Makes More than $250k, and Are They Rich?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 10, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ DC-
Decoder/2012/0710/Obama-tax-proposal-Who-makes-more-than-250k-and-are-they-
rich-video (referring to research by the Tax Policy Center).  
 121  Id. (referencing U.S. Census data).   
 122  See, e.g., Lattman, supra note 43.  It may be the case that bankers and lawyers are 
accredited investors, but the category could just as easily comprise a “rancher who is 
still driving a 1980s-era pickup truck. Or . . . the retiree in Florida who plays tennis 
every day and tells his son or daughter how to run the family business.”  See Scherer, 
supra note 120.   
 123  Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1618; see also David Certner, 
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 
and Rule 144A Offerings, AARP 1, 2 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-
12/s70712-130.pdf (explaining that older investors are some of the most common 
victims of securities fraud).  Moreover, cases involving unregistered securities 
appeared a disproportionate number of times in a 2010 NASAA study of state securities 
regulation enforcement actions on behalf of investors over the age of 50.  Id.  
 124  Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1617. 
 125  Id. at 1619. 
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To staunch opponents of the law, however, choosing to modify 
the conceptualization of “accredited investor” will not remedy the 
situation, as they likewise deem the warnings the SEC requires on 
marketing materials to be deficient.126  People tend to ignore 
cautionary tales if they have already decided on a course of action in 
their minds, and a warning label will not necessarily impede advertisers 
from engaging in unremitted solicitation efforts.127  With a warning 
label as a Band-Aid, issuers may become particularly aggressive in their 
marketing practices: “the combination of advertising plus continued 
and unfettered broker-dealer activity[] would be a disaster.”128  To 
regain a degree of control over brokers, some opponents of Title II 
recommend placing an upper limit on how many individuals can 
participate in a private placement.129 
3. The Current State of Affairs 
The spirited debate surrounding Title II raises the question of 
how, if at all, private placement issuers have changed their business 
strategies in the aftermath of the new law.  The SEC Office of Investor 
Education and Advocacy issued an investor alert in September 2013 
that, among other things, discusses what private placements are and 
the things one should consider when making private placement 
investment decisions.130  This intimates that the SEC anticipated a wave 
of advertising that would increase the general level of interest in 
private placements.131  Hedge funds, private equity firms, and venture 
capital entities, however, have been slow to take advantage of the 
solicitation allowance.132 
 
 126  See generally supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.  
 127  Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1618.  Senator Levin of Michigan is 
concerned that there will be no limit to how hedge funds, as high-risk investments, can 
advertise.  Associated Press, SEC Lifts Ban on Hedge Fund Advertising, BOS. GLOBE (July 
11, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/07/10/sec-lifts-ban-hedge-
fund-advertising/EH6ce6T58xy6KiEqM3yquJ/story.html. 
 128  Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 993, 1011 (2012). 
 129  Id.  
 130  Investor Alert: Advertising for Unregistered Securities Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N 1, 3 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_solicitation.pdf.  
 131  Some have posited that well-off individuals who do not have a broker will be 
most influenced by the ads.  Allen Wastler, What Could Save Hedge Funds? Marketing! 
(Maybe), CNBC (Sept. 21, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101048746.   
 132  “This is a game of dodgeball . . . and we are going to let other people get hit in 
the head with the ball before we start doing it.”  Harvey D. Shapiro, Why Aren’t Hedge 
Funds Advertising?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
online/blogs/currency/2013/10/why-arent-hedge-funds-advertising.html (quoting 
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In fact, only a minute number of hedge funds have begun 
advertising, mostly on social media sites.133  Topturn Capital was the 
first one to issue a public advertisement;134 it also launched an email 
campaign to 350 recipients.135  Ff Venture Capital has likewise taken 
advantage of Title II; in October 2013, it began leveraging social 
media, email, and the web to target potential investors.136  Indeed, 
those issuing private placements have a variety of avenues to choose 
from in terms of how to solicit.  Dow Jones and VentureBeat, for 
example, tout the benefits of advertising in their private equity and 
venture capital publications,137 and on their technology blog,138 
respectively.  Why, then, have the entities in question largely failed to 
advertise? 
First, hedge funds cater to a very narrow demographic: people 
who can afford to invest $1,000,000 at the outset.139  Even with this 
initial hurdle though, four of the six largest funds are not accepting 
new investors.140  Second, institutional investors are a huge part of the 
hedge fund client base, and to appeal to them, the people pitching the 
fund must detail the fund’s success as well as the uniqueness of its 
strategy—points that a solicitation, on its own, may gloss over.141  
 
Anthony Scaramucci, founder and co-managing director of SkyBridge Capital, an 
investment firm).   
 133  Id.  Most of these funds have been seeking seed and early-stage capital.  Dan 
Primack, Why This Hedge Fund Became the First to Advertise, CNN MONEY (Dec. 3, 2013, 
3:30 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/12/03/hedge-fund-advertise/.   
 134  Primack, supra note 133.  The two minute and forty-nine second clip analogizes 
a surfing technique to Topturn’s investment approach: “The whole idea of that 
[top]turn or pivot, to stay in the energy of that wave, is very much like what Greg does 
in the strategy that he runs.”  TOPTURN CAPITAL, http:// www.topturncapital.com/ (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014).  Interestingly, the advertisement does not discuss how Topturn’s 
investments perform.  Primack, supra note 133.  See also infra notes 181–184.  
 135  Mariah Summers, Here’s the First Ever Hedge Fund Ad, Complete with a Professional 
Surfer, BUZZFEED BUS. (Dec. 3, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
mariahsummers/heres-the-first-ever-hedge-fund-ad. 
 136  Russ Garland, Ff Venture Capital Touts Fundraising Under New SEC Rules as Most 
VCs Hold Back, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2013, 10:28 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venture 
capital/2013/10/11/ff-venture-capital-touts-fundraising-under-new-sec-rules-as-most-
vcs-hold-back/; see also Dan Primack, The First VC Firm to ‘Generally Solicit,’ CNN MONEY 
(Oct. 11, 2013, 7:46 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/10/11/the-first-vc-
firm-to-generally-solicit/.  
 137  2014 Media Guide, DOW JONES 1, 4–20 (2013), http://www.dowjones.com/ 
privateequityventurecapital/MediaGuide2014.pdf.  
 138  Advertise on VentureBeat, VENTUREBEAT, http://venturebeat.com/advertise/ (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2014). 
 139  Shapiro, supra note 132. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. 
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Finally, hedge fund insiders are concerned that their colleagues at 
other firms will construe an advertisement by their particular fund as 
a sign of desperation or an indication that business is not going well.142 
In spite of the fact that private placement advertisements have 
been slow to catch on, there is indication that private placement issuers 
support the lifting of the solicitation ban.  The Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (the “CFTC”),143 up until recently, had “a parallel 
rule that prohibit[ed] the private funds it directly overs[aw] from 
advertising to the general public.”144  Thus, someone who took 
advantage of the advertising ban’s removal would have been at risk of 
violating the CFTC’s regulations.145  The Managed Funds Association—
the trade group of the hedge fund industry—urged the CFTC to 
update its rules as far back as 2012.146  The CFTC initially responded 
that such steps were not a priority for it,147 but on September 9, 2014, 
it eased its restrictions to achieve conformity with the SEC’s rules.148  
Funds subject to CFTC oversight may now advertise after notifying the 
CFTC of their intention to do so.149  It is likely that hedge funds, private 
equity firms, and venture capital entities will take advantage of Title II 
at some point in the future, given this newfound regulatory uniformity.  
It is crucial to consider, then, whether the existing regulatory scheme 
is in good enough shape to ensure that the markets will not be worse 
off than prior to Title II’s enactment. 
 
 142  Id.  “[T]he SEC really put the fear in people.”  Summers, supra note 135 
(quoting Mitch Ackles, global president of the Hedge Fund Association, on why no 
one wanted to be the first to advertise). 
 143  Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/About/Mission 
Responsibilities/index.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (The CFTC “protect[s] market 
participants and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and systemic 
risk related to derivatives – both futures and swaps – and to foster transparent, open, 
competitive and financially sound markets.”).   
 144  Sarah N. Lynch, US Hedge Fund Industry Pushing Derivatives Regulator to Lift Ad 
Ban, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/ 
01/08/usa-hedgefunds-advertising-idUSL2N0JY21R20140108; see also Andrew 
Ackerman, CFTC Eases Hedge-Fund Advertising Ban, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2014, 9:10 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulator-eases-longstanding-restrictions-on-priv ate -
fund-offerings-1410311414.   
 145  Lynch, supra note 144. 
 146  Id.  The stance of the Managed Funds Association suggests that, if the CFTC’s 
regulations mirrored those of the SEC, then private placement issuers would be less 
reluctant to begin advertising.   
 147  Id. 
 148  Ackerman, supra note 144. 
 149  Id. 
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V.  ACTION NEEDED ON THE PART OF THE SEC AND SOCIETY 
A. “For I can raise no money by vile means.”150 
Since Congress promulgated Title II, both hedge and private 
funds have noted the potential to generate a significant amount of 
capital through advertising.151  In spite of the possibility of fraud and 
the far-reaching investor protection concerns addressed in Part IV, 
supra, lifting the solicitation ban was necessary.  From the companies’ 
perspective, soliciting is a fact of life in a competitive marketplace.  
Coextensively, if society values giving people the option of whether and 
how to spend their money, then Title II should permit advertising as a 
means of exposing them to the range of possible choices.  As the SEC 
recognized, however, businesses should not have free rein to solicit 
potential buyers in any manner they see fit.  Properly rejecting a 
completely protectionist view, the SEC, as seen in Part IV.A, supra, has 
taken three protective measures in light of Title II’s mandate to 
eliminate the advertising prohibition for Rule 506 offerings:152 (1) 
verifying, through reasonable steps, that everyone purchasing the 
securities is accredited;153 (2) excluding felons and other bad actors 
from tendering securities offerings under the new rule;154 and (3) 
proposing updates to Form D and restrictions and review requirements 
on the solicitation materials.155  While the SEC should be commended 
for taking steps to control the source of the offerings (i.e., by 
disqualifying felons and other bad actors), further refinement is 
needed156 with regard to protecting the target of the offerings.  
Specifically, even though many of the private placements relying on 
 
 150  KENNETH MUIR, SHAKESPEARE’S TRAGIC SEQUENCE 52 (photo. reprint 2005) 
(1972) (quoting Act IV, Scene III of William Shakespeare’s JULIUS CAESAR).   
 151  Collectively, the hedge funds that have filed offerings with the SEC since Title 
II point out that, of the $18,000,000,000 that can be raised, $1,400,000,000 could 
potentially be driven by solicitations.  Lynch, supra note 144.  Similarly, for venture 
capital and private equity funds that have filed offerings with the SEC since Title II, 
$1,800,000,000 of the $90,000,000,000 could conceivably come from advertisements.  
Id.   
 152  See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  
 153  See supra notes 67 and accompanying text. 
 154  See generally supra Part IV.A.1.  
 155  See generally supra Part IV.A.2.  
 156  Venture Capital Investing and JOBS Act, PEARSON SIMON & WARSHAW, 
http://www.pswlaw.com/Practice-Areas/Securities-Litigation/Venture-Capital-
Investing-and-JOBS-Act.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (quoting a convicted securities 
fraudster as stating, “I wish legislators would consult with people like me before they 
write something like this.  I could tell them, I know what your intent was with this 
wording, but we can get around it so easily, it cracks me up.”). 
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Regulation D have historically viewed the funds themselves as the 
“clients,”157 the term “clients” should now include both the accredited 
investors that contribute capital to the funds158 and the people viewing 
the advertisements. 
The SEC’s actions, in their current form, do not adequately 
safeguard prospective buyers and individuals confronted with 
solicitations in the marketplace for two reasons.  First, the final 
regulation conflates accredited investors and sophisticated investors.159  
Second, the proposed rule presupposes that more information is 
necessarily better.160 
By allowing for wide-scale solicitations while restricting sales to 
accredited investors only,161 updated Rule 506(c) seems to suggest that 
accredited investors are less susceptible to making erroneous 
investment decisions in the event that misleading information appears 
in the advertisements.  While this is certainly true in some cases, it is 
dangerous to generalize.  One reason involves the manner in which 
the statute and regulations define “accredited investors.”162  In an age 
where the adult population in the United States has earned over 16 
million Master’s degrees, and over 3 million professional and doctoral 
degrees,163 it is not hard to imagine that a large number of people will 
meet the definition of “accredited investor,” namely, by earning over 
$200,000 annually.164  Although these figures bode well for the level of 
educational attainment in this country, it does not stand to reason that 
 
 157  See, e.g., Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the 
Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 28 (2011); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 879 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the ambiguity inherent in the term “client”); see also Anita 
K. Krug, The Private Fund Adviser Registration Act: HR-3818, BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW, 
BUS. & ECON. 1, 2 (2009).   
 158  Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for “Hedge Fund Regulation”: A 
Reconsideration of “Client” Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 55 VILL. L. REV. 661, 
691 (2010) (suggesting that private funds should regard investors as clients because 
they have discretion to allot funds to the investment advisor and to act on the basis of 
information that such advisor provides). 
 159  See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 162–169.  
 160  See, e.g., supra notes 80, 82, 88–90 and accompanying text.  
 161  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 162  Id.  
 163  Educational Attainment of the Population 18 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/ 
education/data/cps/2012/tables.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (select “All Races” 
XLS file under Table 1).  Specifically, of those in the United States age 25 and over in 
2012, 16,459,000 held Master’s degrees, 3,093,000 held professional degrees, and 
3,178,000 held doctoral degrees.  Id. 
 164  See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text. 
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all high-achievers are financially savvy.  Just because a person has 
earned an advanced degree and obtained “expert” status in one 
discipline does not mean that she will readily understand the 
fundamentals of short-selling, a technique many hedge funds 
employ.165  It can happen, of course, but it is not very likely. 
Indeed, the SEC has left accredited investors to largely fend for 
themselves.166  It has proposed that issuers dump a plethora of 
information on purchasers in the form of additional items on Form 
D,167 legends on solicitation materials,168 and disclaimers when their ads 
feature performance data.169  By doing so, the SEC is assuming—
prematurely—that purchasers will not only read what is presented to 
them, but also understand it and make a decision accordingly. 
The SEC has also left the people viewing the advertisements out 
in the cold.  It does not appear to be all that concerned with the impact 
that this new class of solicitations will have on the general public, 
perhaps because unaccredited investors will not be able to buy 
securities offered under Rule 506(c) anyway.170  What do non-
accredited investors stand to gain or lose, then, as a result of viewing 
these advertisements?  They will definitely not incur any of the benefits 
that flow from a well-informed citizenry.  By confronting these 
advertisements—plastered with disclaimers and warnings171—in the 
newspaper and on television172 with the understanding that they cannot 
participate in the transactions being offered, unaccredited investors 
are likely to walk away not knowing anything more about private 
placements than they did prior to Title II.  While things that are off-
limits tend to have greater allure precisely because they are not easily 
accessible,173 there is also the possibility that non-accredited investors 
will view Rule 506(c) offerings as something to be feared.  Thus, the 
SEC has not struck the right balance—for both accredited investors 
and the people viewing the advertisements—between a knowledgeable 
 
 165  See Office of Investor, supra note 101, at 2.   
 166  Importantly, this Comment does not suggest that accredited investors should 
not bear ultimate responsibility for their investment decisions.  In order to make these 
decisions, however, the SEC has to ensure that better information is made available to 
them.  See generally infra Part V.B.   
 167  See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 168  See supra notes 82–84, 88 and accompanying text. 
 169  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 170  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 171  See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806-
01, 44,822–23 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239). 
 172  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2008).  
 173  See Rodrigues, supra note 101, at 3389 and accompanying text. 
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marketplace and a protected marketplace. 
What, then, needs to be done?  The answer lies in a two-tiered 
approach to investor education.  While financial literacy programs 
have come under fire,174 even those who are generally dubious of such 
programs admit that “[t]he flaws in research claiming that financial-
literacy education is effective do not prove the programs are 
ineffective . . . .”175  A successful framework for investor education 
would comprise one track geared towards investors who are currently 
accredited,176 and another track tailored toward everyone else177—any 
of whom can theoretically become an accredited investor during her 
life.  The approach that either method employs will necessarily differ. 
B. Educational Efforts Directed at Investors Who Are Currently 
Accredited 
Regarding educational efforts directed at investors who are 
currently accredited, both issuers and regulators should be required to 
furnish these investors with better, not merely additional, information.  
This will be especially important in the case of investors who are 
accredited on paper but who have never invested in Rule 506 offerings 
before.  Prior to investing, these “newbies” should be required to 
indicate to a regulatory body, like the SEC or the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, how they heard about the particular investment 
opportunity.  Anyone who selects an issuer’s marketing efforts as the 
reason should then be required to review two types of material: 1) how 
to recognize fraud;178 and 2) how to compare one investment device 
relative to another.179  Regulatory bodies can take a number of tactics 
to furnish investors with both types of information; this Comment 
 
 174  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 791 (2002) (criticizing the general incoherence of such 
programs); Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2013) (tying financial literacy 
education to employees’ retirement prospects).  
 175  Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 210 
(2008).  
 176  See infra Part V.B.  The definition of “accredited” in this context would mirror 
the language of the SEC’s new rule.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)–(D) (2013).  
 177  See infra Part V.C. 
 178  Securities fraud victims typically do not suffer from financial illiteracy per se, 
but rather, do not recognize the indicators typically associated with fraud.  Jayne W. 
Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17 ELDER L.J. 201, 227 (2010).   
 179  See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,806-
01, 44,822–23 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239); see 
also supra text accompanying note 90. 
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presents one possibility for each. 
Regarding fraud recognition, the SEC can issue a short—and 
hopefully entertaining—movie clip depicting how bad actors operate 
and offering tips for what to watch out for.180  Filming someone 
clinically reciting the elements of fraud will not be memorable for 
viewers.  Instead, the clips should be recorded in appropriate 
surroundings and enlist the help of real actors to portray five to ten 
key scenarios that people may encounter.  By injecting a dose of 
realism into these clips, investors will not only view watching them as 
less of a chore, but also be more likely to remember them. 
In light of the findings that emerged around the SEC’s proposed 
rule, it is equally important to give these investors an idea of how to 
compare investments.  In its proposed rule, the SEC requires that 
private funds choosing to rely on advertising include notations on their 
marketing materials clarifying that, inter alia, private funds are not 
required to follow any standard methodology and that a one-to-one 
comparison of private funds’ performance may not be possible.181  
Given that investors consider performance to be a deciding factor in 
choosing whether to take part in an investment,182 it is curious that the 
SEC would take the easy way out by sticking a warning on the 
advertisements.183 
If, on the other hand, issuers prominently display how consistently 
their funds perform from one year to the next, then investors will be 
able to gauge the funds’ volatility and make a personal judgment call.184  
 
 180  See Paula A. Argento, Comments to the SEC on File S7-21-11 Re: Extending Bad Actor 
Disqualifications, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.sec. 
gov/comments/s7-21-11/s72111-39.htm.   
 181  See, e.g., Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
44,822–23; supra text accompanying note 90.  See also Venture Capital Investing, supra 
note 156 (“No doubt the persons soliciting these investment [sic] will emphasize the 
500 to 1000 times returns made on now iconic companies such as Apple and Google.  
What they will not tell you is that only 1 out of 10 startups result [sic] in positive returns 
for venture investors.”).   
 182  See supra text accompanying note 87.  
 183  The SEC’s self-proclaimed mission “is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”  The Investor’s Advocate: How the 
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified 
June 10, 2013) (emphasis added).   
 184  Presently, regulators are concerned about how much value prospective 
investors will place on funds’ past performance.  Fact Sheet: Proposing Amendments to 
Private Offering Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2013/2013-124-item3.htm.  In the retail context, for example, investors 
assess prospective companies on the basis of the advisors’ success in increasing the 
value of the investors’ assets.  Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977).  
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This is particularly important for investors who have not dabbled in 
private placements before and who may not fully understand the 
extent to which they differ from retail funds, specifically in the area of 
risk.  Although such measures will not inform investors as to how much 
profit they can expect, mandatory data on consistency in returns over 
time will provide a quick means for a prospective purchaser to decide 
whether Fund X aligns with his individual comfort level for volatility, 
compared to Fund Y. 
Upon taking both of these steps, the investor should be made to 
certify that he or she has completed the review and to complete a brief 
“quiz” of five to ten questions, before being permitted to invest as he 
or she wishes.  Accredited investors who already participate in Rule 506 
offerings, however, should not be required to go through these same 
steps.  Rather, they should be made aware that this material is available.  
Issuers can help in this regard.  For example, hedge fund investment 
advisors typically enjoy a personal relationship with each investor due 
to the longstanding private placement rules.185  Using what they know 
about their clients, they can highlight the benefits of accessing the 
material by translating it into something that they know their clients 
value, e.g., entering everyone who reviews the information into a 
drawing for a dinner party at a Michelin-starred restaurant. 
C. Educational Efforts Directed at the General Population 
In terms of educational programs intended for the general 
population, there must be a push to create a culture of financial 
literacy—rather than of information overload—beginning in 
elementary schools and continuing throughout the formal education 
system.  The shocking statistic that an estimated less than four percent 
of Americans are fully capable of comprehending investment products 
and asset allocations misses the mark.186  Ensuring that every citizen 
achieves an all-encompassing understanding of the financial market’s 
inner workings is a pipe dream at best.  Yet, most of the Americans who 
will encounter the general solicitations are arguably capable of 
becoming conversant in basic finance.  Elementary school health 
classes frequently strive to illustrate the benefits of eating balanced 
meals, and colleges routinely require students to earn a certain 
number of credits in disciplines like English in order to graduate.  
Ensuring that future generations of Americans are healthy and able to 
speak properly are certainly worthy goals; is it not just as critical to 
 
 185  Cable, supra note 23, at 134.  
 186  Barnard, supra note 178, at 226–27.   
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provide them with the tools to look out for their own financial 
welfare?187  Financial literacy needs to be prioritized to a similar 
extent—through mandatory coursework—if the investment landscape 
is, indeed, changing.188 
Fortunately, tools are already available for schools to either use or 
model their own efforts on.  TheMint, an interactive website designed 
to assist parents and teachers in instructing children on how to manage 
money and be financially responsible,189 is a prime example of a tool 
that can be used in elementary and middle schools.  Among other 
things, the site offers easy-to-read material on mutual funds190 as well as 
opportunities to practice writing checks.191  LearnVest, an online site 
that offers personalized financial advice with apps that users can access 
from their iPhones,192 provides a similar model for high school and 
college students, many of whom have part-time jobs.  It provides 
unlimited phone and email access to a financial planner who routinely 
issues actionable challenges in line with users’ goals.193 
Moreover, there is reason to be optimistic about the ability of 
private placement issuers to realize these suggestions.  Because hedge 
funds, unlike mutual funds, lack boards of directors, additional 
investor protection measures may be easier for the former to 
implement.194  As an added bonus, “the financial-services industry 
uniformly supports financial-literacy initiatives, both rhetorically and 
with multimillion-dollar donations . . . .”195 
 
 
 187  A survey of 18- to 24-year-olds who rent found that more than 20% of the group 
spends at least $100 more than it earns every month.  Martha C. White, Today’s Young 
Adults Will Never Pay Off Their Credit Card Debts, TIME BUS. & MONEY (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://business.time.com/2013/01/17/todays-young-adults-will-never-pay-off-their-
credit-card-debts/.  Further, individuals born between 1980 and 1984 have more than 
$5,689 “in credit card debt than their parents did at that age.”  Id.  
 188  See supra text accompanying notes 60–62.   
 189  About the Mint, THEMINT, http://www.themint.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 24, 
2015).  
 190  Mutual Funds, THEMINT, http://www.themint.org/teens/mutual-funds.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015).  
 191  Writing a Check, THEMINT, http://www.themint.org/teens/writing-a-check.html 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015).  
 192  Our Mission, LEARNVEST, http://www.learnvest.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 
24, 2015); How It Works, LEARNVEST, https://www.learnvest.com/personal-financial-
planning-program/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).  
 193  How It Works, supra note 192.  
 194  Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument: The Limitations of the Corporate 
Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 278 (2013). 
 195  Willis, supra note 175, at 209.  
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In a society that prides itself on offering countless opportunities 
for upward mobility—where the students of today may well be the 
accredited investors of tomorrow—personal knowledge is perhaps the 
supreme source of empowerment.  Shifting the balance of power from 
brokers to members of the investing public in this way better equips 
the latter to take on an active role in managing their financial lives.  
Knowledgeable investors benefit from securities regulation because of 
their awareness that brokers must cater to them when selecting 
investments.196 
An important caveat underlying these suggestions for both 
accredited investors and the people viewing the advertisements, 
however, is that education is a two-way street.  Individuals may have the 
most up-to-date, accurate information at their fingertips, but unless 
they put the time in to reinforce the material, they will have little, if 
anything, to show for it.  As a result, it is crucial to understand that 
taking these measures will not necessarily immunize people from 
making poor investment decisions.197  Although issuers and regulatory 
bodies should be responsible for furnishing accredited investors and 
the people viewing advertisements with the right kind of information, in 
the end, the onus should be on investors to make informed decisions 
on the basis of the tools they have available. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Title II of the JOBS Act and the corresponding SEC regulations 
have ushered in a new wave of advertising efforts that the public has 
never been confronted with before.  Permitting issuers transacting in 
Rule 506 offerings to solicit to the general public is a necessary step to 
ensuring the freedom of businesses to compete and the freedom of 
individuals to make investments (or not) as they see fit.  At the same 
time, placing no restrictions on marketing strategies has the potential 
to ignite a firestorm of fraud and investor safety concerns.  The SEC 
correctly recognized these dangers in the final and proposed rules it 
put forth concurrently with lifting the advertising prohibition. 
 
 
 
 196  Chelsea P. Ferrette, The Myth of Investor Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act and the 
Office of the Investor Advocate, 12 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 61, 69 (2011). 
 197  “The ill-educated and unfocused often fail. . . . some will win big, some will lose 
big, but most will live comfortable lives in the middle.” Bill O’Reilly, Hating the Rich, 
BILL O’REILLY (May 17, 2012), http://www.billoreilly.com/newsletter 
column?pid=37019.  
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Although these protective measures are a step in the right 
direction, they do not go far enough.  Separate investor education 
programs, one geared at investors who are currently accredited and 
another targeted at the general population, respectively, must be put 
in place if the solicitation ban’s repeal is to be a positive step for 
securities regulation.  While the emphasis of the accredited investor 
program should be on identifying fraud and evaluating consistency in 
returns over time, the program directed at the general population 
should champion widespread financial literacy.  By leading the charge 
to supply both groups with better information, the SEC will move 
closer to protecting the markets by empowering society to protect 
itself. 
 
